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Mortgagedealslending Zh Importance Of The Jumbo Mortgage Loans Mortgage Deals Lending 《The Economist》《经济学人》中文版 - 博客大巴
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ut Importance while the huge wealth that Americans have lost may induce more of them to work for longer.
单独来看这是一个残酷的消息，然而是经济大萧条把事情弄得更糟吗？理论上讲，是的。暴跌的投资会减缓创新的速度。飚升的国债导致利率升高。旨在减少债务的
更高额税金或许会降低工作和投资的动机。在金融与其它领域的更多监管会阻碍创新。做为失业的恶果，工人们的技能可能会退化。从正面上看，政府对基础设施和
教育有的放矢的投资能够提升潜在产出，尽管美国人失去的巨额财富可能促使更多的人工作更长时间。
History sends mixed signals about how much these effects matter.
Surprisingly, the 1930s bode well. Despite the deep slump in growth and
investment, America’s potential growth rate is reckoned to have risen
smartly during the decade, as innovations from nylon to synthetic
rubber proliferated, while business processes were fundamentally
overhauled. Alexander Field, an economist at Santa Clara University,
has called the 1930s the “most technologically progressive” decade of
the 20th century.
对于这些对此问题的影响有多大，历史给出了混杂的答案。令人吃惊的是，30年代预示了良好的形势。尽管增长与投资暴跌，但由于诸如尼龙和人造橡胶等创新的
普及，美国的潜在增长率经计算在这10年中还有小幅上升。在此期间商业过程得到根本性的革新。Santa Clara大学的经济学家Alexander
Field将30年代称之为20世纪“最技术革新”的十年。
In the modern era Sweden offers grounds for optimism. Its productivity
growth accelerated after the early 1990s financial crash, in part
because the government dealt swiftly with the banking mess.
Japan, in contrast, saw productivity growth shrivel in the early 1990s.
Several studies pin blame for that on Japan’s unwillingness to tackle
its banking mess. But the process was not irreversible; Adam Posen of
the Peterson Institute has argued that by the late 1990s Japan’s
potential output had risen modestly, thanks to financial reform and
broader deregulation. Nor is there much sign that Japan’s gaping budget
deficits have crowded out private investment.
Yields on long-term Japanese bonds slumped from 7% in 1990 to 1% in
2003, and are still only 1.45%, even as gross public debt is heading
for 200% of GDP.
在现代，瑞典为乐观者提供了坚实土壤。它的生产力增长在90年代早期金融冲击后加速，这部分得益于政府对银行坏帐的及时处置。日本则与其恰恰相反，在90
年代早期它的生产力增长减缓。许多研究将批评矛头指向日本无意解决它的银行坏帐问题。但这个过程不是不可逆的。Peterson研究所的 Adam
Posen
认为由于金融改革和更大规模的解除管制，日本的潜在产量在90年代后期有了适当上升。也没有什么迹象表明日本那令人吃惊的预算赤字对私人投资产生了挤出效
应。日本长期债券收益从1990年的7％跌落至2003年的1％。即使公共负债的总额达到GDP的两倍，收益也只有1.45％。
Is this cause for optimism about America? Possibly not. Compared with
the 1930s, America’s workers are more specialised, which makes it
harder to shift occupation; they are also more cushioned with social
protection, which reduces the urgency to adapt. Workers are less
flexible because the housing bust will prevent many from selling their
houses to move to where the jobs are. JPMorgan estimates that America’s
natural rate of joblessness may have risen from 4.75% to closer to 6%.
这是对美国持乐观精神的原因吗？可能不是。与30年代相比，美国工人们变得更加专业，这使得他们更难更换工作；社会保护措施给了他们更多的缓冲，这就降低
了他们适应当前形势的迫切性。工人们并没有多少灵活性，因为房地产的破产将阻碍许多人卖掉房屋从而搬迁到能够找到工作的地方。JPMorgan
预计美国的自然失业率可能从4.75％上升至接近6％。
Today’s investment slump may have particularly pernicious effects on
productivity because, unlike Japan’s, it does not follow a
capital-spending binge. During the recent bubble years, America’s
housing investment boomed, but corporate investment was laid low by the
dotcom bust.
现今暴跌的投资可能对生产力有显著的恶劣影响，因为随它而来的并不是资本消费的盛宴，这与日本不同。在最近充满泡沫的几年里，美国的房地产投资很繁荣，但公司投资由于之前的互联网崩溃而处于低位。
Debt burden
债务负担
Most important, even if Americans become thriftier, soaring public debt
may crowd out private investment more than in Japan, which, unlike
America, is a creditor country. Already American bond yields are
starting to rise. Academics differ about just how much bigger budget
deficits and higher public debt affect interest rates, but most agree
that they do. A 2004 study suggests that interest rates rise by 0.03%
for every 1% increase in the debt/GDP ratio. That ratio is set to rise
by 30 percentage points between 2008 and 2011, which implies a 1%
higher risk-free interest rate, and commensurately lower private-sector
investment. Even if higher private saving blunts the effect, some
crowding out is eventually all too likely.
最关键的是，即使美国人变得节俭了，飞涨的公共债务可能会对私人投资产生挤出效应，而且要比日本的更厉害。而日本是一个债权人国家，这与美国不同。美国债
券收益已经开始上升。学者们只就多大的预算赤字和多高的公共负债会影响利率意见不同，但多数人认为它们的确会影响利率。一份2004年的研究显示负债与
GDP之比每提高1％，利率就升高0.03％。在2008到2011间，这个比值将固定为上升30个百分点，这就意味着无风险利率每升高1％，私人部门投
资就会降低相应的数额。即使更多的个人储蓄会弱化这一效应，某些挤出效应将最终与其类似。
All of these effects can be mitigated by good policies, or exacerbated
by bad ones. Sensible approaches to reducing America’s long-term
deficit, by tackling entitlement spending or reforming the tax code,
would minimise the rise in long-term yields and might even boost
potential growth. Misguided efforts to prop up declining industries or
dictate lending decisions would add to the damage. America is heading
for an era of slower growth. Just how much slower is still up for grabs.
所有的这些影响可以通过实施好的政策得以减轻，也可以在不力政策下进一步恶化。通过解决授权支出或改革税法的办法是削减美国长期赤字的明智方法，这将使长
期收益的增长最小化并且甚至可能提高潜在增长。支持衰微产业或指定贷款决议的误入歧途的努力会增加损害。美国正在走向慢速增长的时代。只是到底有多慢，这
还有待观察。